innosferaНаука и инновацииScience and Innovations1818-98572412-9372Издательский дом «Белорусская наука»innosfera-515Research ArticleТЕМА НОМЕРА: ЭМЕРДЖЕНТНОСТЬ: КОНТЕКСТ ИМЕЕТ ЗНАЧЕНИЕОб эмерджентности групповых убеждений и знанийOn the emergence of group beliefs and knowledgeПрисьИ.PrisI.

Игорь Прись, ведущий научный сотрудник, кандидат физико-математических наук, доктор философии (PhD)

Igor Pris

Институт философии НАН БеларусиBelarus2023081220230113235Copyright © Издательский дом «Белорусская наука», 20232023Издательский дом «Белорусская наука»Издательский дом «Белорусская наука»https://innosfera.belnauka.by/jour/about/submissions#copyrightNoticehttps://innosfera.belnauka.by/jour/article/view/515

Рассмотрены некоторые аспекты предполагаемой эмерджентности групповых эпистемических свойств – убеждений и знаний.

The author considers some aspects of the supposed emergence of group epistemic properties, the beliefs and knowledge.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.